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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES


23 August 1951

DRAFT

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN BREAKING OFF THE KAESONG NEGOTIATIONS

## (Alternative Paragraph 2)

2. The Communists must realize the probability that a effect of some state of the probability that a in Korea will lead to expansion of the war by the US, with the consequent increase of danger of general war. We believe as we have stated in NIE-25 that the Kremlin will continue to aid the Communists in ways which the Kremlin estimates would not involve serious danger of a break between the USSR and the US/UN. If the Communist forces in Korea were threatened with decisive defeat, the Kremlin would probably intensify its aid, perhaps eventually including the use of Soviet forces to the extent that a defacto local war between



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renewed Communist

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the US/UN and USSR would exist. At every stage, however, the Kremlin would probably endeavor to keep open the possibility of ending the Korean conflict by negotiation, if the global interests of the USSR would be served by disengagement in Korea. We therefore conclude that even though the Kaesong talks have been broken off, there is a real likelihood that the Communists will attempt to reopen the cease fire negotiations in the near future, probably on a political rather than a military level.

